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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Appellant Isaac Joseph Rinke was charged with four felony charges in his
underlying criminal case in Ada County, Idaho.

He eventually pled guilty to two

charges, Felony Domestic Battery and Attempted Strangulation.

Mr. Rinke filed a

Petition For Post-Conviction Relief against his appointed counsel. The District Court
summarily dismissed Mr. Rinke’s Petition.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Rinke was charged on September 12, 2013 with four felony charges, Felony
Domestic Battery (I.C. §18-918(2)), Attempted Strangulation (I.C. §18-923), Aggravated
Assault With a Deadly Weapon or Instrument (I.C. §18-905(a)), and Second Degree
Kidnapping (I.C. §18-4501). The State also filed a sentencing enhancement for Use of a
Deadly Weapon in the Commission of a Felony (I.C. §19-2520).
The Court appointed the Ada County Public Defender’s Office to represent Mr.
Rinke. Mr. Rinke was represented in the case by attorneys Ann Cosho, Reed Smith and
Anthony Geddes of the Ada County Public Defender’s Office. Mr. Smith acted as lead
counsel. Ms. Cosho only represented Mr. Rinke at the Magistrate Court level, for Mr.
Rinke’s preliminary hearing (which was waived). Mr. Geddes only represented Mr.
Rinke at his sentencing hearing, as Mr. Smith was unavailable for the hearing date.
Mr. Rinke suffered from significant mental health issues during the pendency of
his case. (See R. 382 (Tr. p. 75, l. 5 to p. 76, l. 12). He was never comprehensively
evaluated for mental health status or competency or for his ability to assist in his own
defense.
6

Mr. Rinke pled guilty on October 10, 2013 to two charges, Felony Domestic
Battery and Attempted Strangulation. The State dismissed the remaining charges and the
sentencing enhancement.
The District Court Judge, Michael Wetherell, sentenced Mr. Rinke to a maximum
term of ten years on the Felony Domestic Battery charge, and a maximum term of fifteen
years on the Attempted Strangulation charge. The District Court ordered the sentences to
run consecutively to each other, for a total term of twenty-five years imprisonment, with
ten years determinate and fifteen years indeterminate. Mr. Rinke is currently incarcerated
at the Idaho State Correctional Institution in Boise, Idaho.
Mr. Rinke appealed from the judgment of conviction to the Idaho Supreme Court.
(Docket Number #41696-2013). The Idaho State Appellate Public Defender’s Office
represented Mr. Rinke on the direct appeal. The Idaho Court of Appeals denied Mr.
Rinke’s appeal, and affirmed the judgment and sentence imposed therein. The Court of
Appeals issued its remittitur in the appeal to the District Court on August 26, 2014.
Mr. Rinke filed his Petition For Post-Conviction Relief on June 25, 2015. He
subsequently filed an Amended Petition For Post-Conviction Relief on August 2, 2016.
Mr. Rinke filed numerous documents, affidavits and records in support of his postconviction petition.
The State filed a motion for summary dismissal of Mr. Rinke’s post-conviction
case. The matter proceeded to hearing on October 11, 2016. Judge Samuel Hoagland
presided over the proceedings, as Judge Michael Wetherell had retired in the interim.
The District Court issued its opinion on November 21, 2016, in which it granted
summary dismissal of Mr. Rinke’s post-conviction petition. The Court issued Judgment
in favor of the State and against Mr. Rinke on November 23, 2016.
7

Mr. Rinke filed this appeal on December 23, 2016.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.
Whether the District Court committed reversible error by summarily dismissing
Mr. Rinke’s Post-Conviction Petition?
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ARGUMENT
I. The District Court Committed Reversible Error By Summarily Dismissing Mr.
Rinke’s Petition For Post-Conviction Relief.

A.

Introduction
An application for Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”) under Idaho Code §19-4901 et

seq., initiates a special proceeding, which is civil in nature, and is an entirely new
proceeding, distinct from the criminal action which led to the conviction. Paradis v.
State, 110 Idaho 534, 536 (1986); Reynolds v. State, 126 Idaho 24, 27 (Ct. App. 1994).
In a post-conviction proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish grounds for
relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Cosio-Nava v. State, __ Idaho __ (2016)(2016
Opinion No. 119, ps. 3-4, Nov. 2, 2016); Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816 (Ct. App.
1995); Reynolds, supra; Odom v. State, 121 Idaho 625, 626 (Ct. App. 1992).
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may be brought under
the post-conviction procedure act. Eddington v. State, __ Idaho __ (Ct. App. 2017)(2017
Opinion No. 25, p. 4, May 8, 2017); Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 272 (Ct. App.
2002).
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the effective assistance of counsel
at “critical stages of a criminal proceeding”, including when the defendant enters a guilty
plea. Jae Lee v. U.S., 582 U.S. ___, ___, __ S.Ct. __, __ L.Ed.2d __ (2017)(issued June
23, 2017)(citing Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 165, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 182 L.Ed.2d 398
(2012); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985)).
The United States Supreme Court issued its landmark ruling on ineffective
assistance of counsel claims in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052,
9

80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court first defined the
right to counsel contained within the Sixth Amendment as the right to the effective
assistance of counsel. Id., 466 U.S. at 686 (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759,
771, n. 14, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970)). Counsel can deprive a defendant of
the right to effective assistance of counsel simply by failing to render “adequate legal
assistance.” Id. (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d
333 (1980)). The purpose of the right is, simply, to ensure a fair trial. Id. “The
benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct
so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be
relied on as having produced a just result.” Id.
The Strickland case established a two-prong test for analyzing ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. To prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel,
the Petitioner must demonstrate (1) that trial counsel’s performance was “deficient”, and
(2) that the Petitioner was prejudiced by counsel’s performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at
687. This standard has been applied word-for-word by the Idaho appellate courts. See,
e.g., Wurdemann v. State, __ Idaho __ (2017)(2017 Opinion No. 24, p. 4, Feb. 28, 2017);
Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 561 (2006).
To establish that trial counsel’s performance was deficient, the petitioner must
show that the attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 118 (Ct.
App. 1997). The proper measure of attorney performance is “reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; Wurdemann, supra, p. 10.
The petitioner must overcome a presumption that the attorney’s conduct falls within a
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wide range of reasonable professional assistance and sound trial strategy. Strickland, 466
U.S. at 689; Estrada, 143 Idaho at 561.
Proving “prejudice” requires a showing that “there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 323 (1995)(citing Strickland, supra); Parrott v.
State, 117 Idaho 272, 275 (1990). A “reasonable probability” is defined as “a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Booth
v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 618 (2011)(citing McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570 (2010) and
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
In summary, in cases like Mr. Rinke’s where the petitioner pleads guilty and then
asserts a PCR claim, the "prejudice requirement … focuses on whether counsel's
constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process. In
other words, in order to satisfy the "prejudice" requirement, the defendant must show that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59.
The Strickland decision outlines specific duties that trial counsel must honor in
representing criminal defendants. Counsel must assist the defendant as part and parcel of
counsel’s duty of loyalty to the defendant. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Counsel’s
“overarching duty” to advocate the defendant’s cause includes the duty to consult with
the defendant on important decisions and to keep the defendant informed of important
developments in the course” of the case. Id. Counsel has a duty to make “reasonable
investigations” regarding the case. Id., 466 U.S. at 691. Counsel has a duty to “bring to
bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing
process.” Id., 466 U.S. at 688.
11

The United States Supreme Court has declared that the “ultimate focus of the
inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness” of the proceedings throughout the case. Id.,
466 U.S. at 696. They further declared that
“In every case, the court should be concerned with whether,
despite the strong presumption of reliability, the result of the particular
proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process
that our system counts on to produce just results.” Id.

B.

Standard of Review
On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, the appellate court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on
file. Wheeler v. State, ___ Idaho ___ (2017)(2017 Opinion No. 72, p. 3, June 21, 2017)
(citing Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523 (2007)(further citations omitted). A claim
for post-conviction relief may only be summarily dismissed if it does not present a
genuine issue of material fact. Id. (citing 19-4906(b); Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148,
153 (2008)); Thomas v. State, __ Idaho __, 389 P.3d 200 (Ct. App. 2017)(2017 Opinion
No. 6, p. 3, Jan. 27, 2017).
Over questions of law in post-conviction summary dismissal, the courts are to
exercise free review. Ash v. State, __ Idaho __ (Ct. App. 2017)(2017 Opinion No. 27 p.
4, June 7, 2017)(citing Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250 (2009) and Downing v.
State, 136 Idaho 367, 370 (Ct. App. 2001)).
The Idaho Supreme Court has addressed the matter of uncontroverted allegations
in post-conviction claims. Although courts need not accept the petitioner’s ultimate
conclusions, courts are required to accept the petitioner’s unrebutted allegations as true.
Saykhamchone, supra (citing Kraft v. State, 100 Idaho 671, 674 (1979)); Bure v. State,
12

126 Idaho 253, 254 (Ct. App. 1994). The Court’s language in the referenced cases leaves
no doubt that this is a mandatory, rather than discretionary, determination. If the
petitioner’s allegations are unrebutted, they must be accepted as true and accurate, and
treated as same by the court. Further, “ … the courts must liberally construe the facts and
draw reasonable inferences in favor of the petitioner.” Wheeler, supra (citing
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792 (2004)).

C.

Rinke was only required to show a prima facie case to avoid summary dismissal.
At the summary judgment stage of the proceedings, Mr. Rinke was not required to

prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence. Rather, for purposes of surviving
summary judgment or summary dismissal, Mr. Rinke was only required to establish a
prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel. Ash, supra, at 3; Schultz v. State,
153 Idaho 791, 796 (Ct. App. 2012). Mr. Rinke respectfully asserts that the District
Court erred by requiring Mr. Rinke to show more than a prima facie case at the summary
judgment stage.
Mr. Rinke provided evidence to support each of his claims, as discussed in detail
below. Mr. Rinke recognized that while the parties and the District Court may have
disagreed about the strength of that evidence, the District Court erred by not conceding
that Mr. Rinke had clearly provided evidence on each claim in his PCR Petition. In doing
so, Mr. Rinke laid out a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, and
therefore, summary dismissal was simply inappropriate. See Payne v. State, 159 Idaho
879, 883 (Ct. App. 2016); Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792. Since a genuine issue of
material fact had been presented with supporting evidence, the District Court should have
denied summary dismissal and conducted an evidentiary hearing to resolve the factual
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issues. Takhsilov v. State,__ Idaho __, 389 P.3d 955 (Ct. App. 2016)(2016 Opinion No.
136, p. 4, Nov. 23, 2016)(citing Goodwin, supra, 138 Idaho at 272).
The District Court erred by granting summary judgment and failing to allow Mr.
Rinke an evidentiary hearing. This Court should remedy that error.

D.

The Petitioner Provided Sufficient Evidence in Support of His Post-Conviction
Petition To Avoid Summary Judgment.
In order to avoid summary judgment and move on to an evidentiary hearing in his

PCR case, Mr. Rinke was required to present evidence making a prima facie case on each
element of his claims. Ash, supra; Schultz, supra; Payne, 159 Idaho at 883. Mr. Rinke
met his burden, as discussed in detail below.

1.

Evidence in support of First Cause of Action

Mr. Rinke’s first cause of action focused on errors and omissions of his trial court
counsel during the “pre-trial phase” of his criminal case. (See R. 008-09, 280-82). Mr.
Rinke alleged that his counsel failed to adequate prepare Mr. Rinke’s defense for trial,
failed to spend sufficient time with and confer with Mr. Rinke regarding trial strategies
and defenses, and failed to investigate information, important evidence, and potential
witnesses, to bolster Mr. Rinke’s chances of establishing a viable defense to the charges
against him. (Id.). Mr. Rinke’s claims were based on the directive of the U.S. Supreme
Court in Strickland, requiring trial counsel to “conduct reasonable investigations” as part
of his mandated duties in representation of criminally-accused persons. See Strickland,
466 U.S. at 691.
The District Court rejected these claims, basically on the grounds that Mr. Rinke
failed to inform the Court of any issues at his plea colloquy (R. 498-99). Regarding the
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failure to investigate and interview witnesses, the Court ignored the evidence offered in
support of these claims and instead offered cursory legal conclusions.

(R. 500).

Regarding counsel’s failure to obtain physical evidence, the Court again ignored relevant
evidence in support of these claims, and instead offered the legal conclusion that Mr.
Rinke failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact. (R. 501). Most importantly, it
appears that the District Court did not follow the appropriate standard, and required Mr.
Rinke to show more than a prima facie case at the summary judgment stage of the PCR
proceedings. See Ash, supra, at 3; Blackburn v. State, __ Idaho __, 391 P.3d 654 (Ct.
App. 2017)(2017 Opinion No. 12, p. 3, Feb. 9, 2017).
Rinke provided evidence and proof in support of the claims comprising his first
cause of action, in the form of his sworn statements in his initial PCR petition and in his
two affidavits. (See R. 008-09, 280-282, 300-07, 315-319).
Mr. Rinke’s affidavits outlined and explained these allegations in detail, including
the specific witnesses and evidence he requested that his counsel pursue in his defense.
(See R. 303-305, 314-20).
Concerning his claim that his attorney failed to investigate evidence and witnesses
in his defense, Mr. Rinke also submitted evidence in the form of affidavits from potential
defense witnesses Rebecca Goodwin, Yurek Hansen, Jonathan Scaggs and Jim Moison.
(See R. 350-65).
Ms. Goodwin’s affidavit and Mr. Hansen’s affidavit provided crucial information
regarding their respective conversations with the complaining witness after the alleged
events that led to Mr. Rinke’s arrest and charges. Mr. Rinke alleged that these versions
differed significantly from the version of events which the complaining witness provided
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to investigating officers and to the Court, creating ripe grounds for cross-examination and
impeachment of the State’s only witness. Mr. Rinke testified that he requested that his
counsel contact these witnesses and interview them regarding this crucial evidence. (See
R. 303-04). Counsel failed to do so. This allegation was not controverted by the State.
Mr. Moison’s affidavit provided potentially valuable impeachment evidence
against the State’s only eyewitness and complaining witness. Mr. Rinke’s counsel could
have utilized this evidence to attack the veracity and credibility of the State’s key
witness, and frame her character for untruthfulness, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence
608, significantly bolstering Mr. Rinke’s defense. Counsel failed to contact this witness
or pursue this evidence, according to Mr. Moison. This was not disputed by the State.
These affidavits confirmed counsel’s failure to contact these important witnesses
and obtain this crucial evidence, despite direct requests from his client to do so. In
providing these affidavits in support of his claims, Mr. Rinke raised a genuine issue of
material fact, meeting his burden to defeat summary dismissal on this count.

See

McKinney v. State, __ Idaho __ (2017)(2017 Opinion No. 64, p. 4, June 20, 2017); Idaho
Code §19-4906(c). The District Court erred by ruling otherwise.
Mr. Rinke filed a second Affidavit which outlined and explained these allegations
in more detail, and included the specific documents which he requested his counsel
obtain in his defense. (See R. 314-65).
In Mr. Rinke’s second affidavit, he provided additional evidence to support his
claim regarding his counsel’s failure to obtain physical evidence in Mr. Rinke’s defense,
in the form of phone and work records. (See R. 314-43). Mr. Rinke’s second affidavit
outlined the importance of this evidence, and how it could have been utilized by his

16

counsel to attack the State’s only witness’ credibility and bolster a defense against the
charges. Again, this constituted substantial proof in support of his claims, and satisfied
the initial threshold for overcoming summary disposition.

In addition, Mr. Rinke alleged that his counsel failed to request a comprehensive
mental health evaluation in the case, and provided no notice to the Court of Mr. Rinke’s
depreciated mental status, despite his awareness that Mr. Rinke was experiencing serious
mental health issues and may have lacked the capacity to assist in his own defense or
enter a valid plea.

Mr. Rinke provided direct evidence of this claim through his PCR

Petition as well as his Affidavit in support. (See R. 282-83, 305-09). Notably, Mr.
Rinke’s counsel conceded that they were aware of his ongoing mental health issues, in
counsel’s own statements to the District Court at sentencing. (See R. 382 (Tr. p. 75, l. 5
to p. 76, l. 12)(stating that “from the very beginning”, Mr. Rinke’s counsel and the
prosecuting attorney were aware of and concerned with Rinke’s mental health status)).
Mr. Rinke provided substantial additional evidence to support this particular
claim, in the form of the report of Dr. Clay H. Ward, PhD, a respected Boise
neuropsychologist. Dr. Ward’s report provided crucial evidence regarding Mr. Rinke’s
mental state and mental health status during the pendency of the case. (See R. 39299)(consisting of Dr. Ward’s Neuropsychological Evaluation of Isaac Rinke). Dr. Ward
indicated that the
“records suggest he started decompensating mentally in response to a combination
of work and relational stress, marijuana use, and his spouse having a miscarriage. There
is strong evidence he was experiencing an acute mental health exacerbation and crisis
when incarcerated on his current offenses. I saw no evidence in the record that his
mental state was stabilized prior to his legal proceedings.” Id. at p. 8.
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For purposes of attempted summary dismissal by the State, the report provided
more than ample evidence to support Mr. Rinke’s PCR claim, and demonstrated that Mr.
Rinke was entitled to a hearing on the merits. See Garza v. State, __ Idaho __ (Ct. App.
2017)(2017 Opinion No. 7, p.4, Feb. 2, 2017); Schultz v. State, 155 Idaho 877, 881, 318
P.3d 646, 650 (Ct. App. 2013)(holding that when “a genuine issue of material fact is
presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted to resolve the factual issues”).
Mr. Rinke provided additional evidence to support this claim in the form of an
affidavit from his acquaintance, Jonathan Scaggs. Mr. Scaggs’ affidavit provided insight
and information regarding Mr. Rinke’s rapidly declining mental health state during the
days leading up to the events in question. (See R. 362-63). This sworn testimony
provided further evidence that Mr. Rinke’s claim had merit and should not have been
summarily dismissed.
Based on a thorough review of the totality of the circumstances, Mr. Rinke had
a clear argument that, his counsel’s errors, omissions, and failure to conduct reasonable
investigations in Rinke’s case affected the plea process and strongly influenced Mr.
Rinke to plead guilty and “cut his losses” rather than proceed to trial without effective
counsel to help defend him. Mr. Rinke himself testified that he would have insisted on
going to trial if his attorney had pursued the witnesses and evidence he requested, and
took the time and effort to help build Mr. Rinke’s defense. (See R. 305, 320-21).
As discussed herein above, in cases like Mr. Rinke’s where the petitioner pleads
guilty and then asserts a PCR claim, the "prejudice requirement … focuses on whether
counsel's constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea
process. In other words, in order to satisfy the "prejudice" requirement, the defendant
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would
18

not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474
U.S. at 59. In this regard, Mr. Rinke meets the Hill v. Lockhart standard.
In summary, Rinke has set forth a prima facie case of Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel on the First Cause of Action in his Petition. Mr. Rinke’s attorney’s deficient
performance fell below objective standards of reasonableness (see Strickland, 466 U.S. at
687). Under well-established Idaho post-conviction law, defense counsel had a duty to
conduct a reasonable, prompt, and thorough investigation in every case. Mitchell v. State,
132 ldaho 274, 280 (1998); Eddington, supra, p. 11. In analyzing a claim that counsel
had neglected that duty, the courts are to consider not only the evidence known to
counsel, but also whether that "known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to
investigate further." Murphy v. State, 143 ldaho 139, 146 (Ct. App. 2006). Mr. Rinke’s
attorney did not investigate further. Mr. Rinke set forth sufficient evidence that his
attorney failed in these specifically-delineated duties under post-conviction precedent.
Based thereon, summary dismissal was not appropriate, and the District Court erred.

2.

Evidence in support of Second Cause of Action

Mr. Rinke’s second cause of action focused on errors and omissions of his trial
court counsel during the “plea and pre-sentencing phase” of his underlying criminal case.
(R. 284-86). Mr. Rinke alleged that his attorney failed to investigate Rinke’s mental
health state or request a mental health examination, despite admitting to having clear
knowledge of Mr. Rinke’s severe, debilitating and ongoing mental health issues. Counsel
allowed Mr. Rinke to proceed with an entry of a guilty plea under the same
circumstances, despite having information that the plea may not have been knowing,
voluntary, intelligent and with a complete understanding of its consequences.
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In his second cause of action, Mr. Rinke further alleged that his counsel made
assertions to Mr. Rinke regarding the proposed plea agreement, which either were not
accurate or were not placed on the record at the hearing in which Mr. Rinke pled guilty.
Mr. Rinke detrimentally relied upon these statements when he made the decision to plead
guilty to two serious felony charges, and waived his right to a jury trial. Additionally,
Mr. Rinke was sentenced to a harsher sentence based in part on the prosecuting attorney’s
recommendations, which counsel misrepresented to Mr. Rinke.
The District Court rejected these claims by claiming that Mr. Rinke failed to raise
a genuine issue of material fact (R. 496-97) and by declaring that the Court itself had
cured any error or omission by counsel (R. 504).
Most importantly, it appears that the District Court did not follow the appropriate
standard, and required Mr. Rinke to show more than a prima facie case at the summary
judgment stage of the PCR proceedings. See Ash, supra, at 3; Blackburn, supra, at 3
Garza, supra, at 3.
Mr. Rinke provided evidence in support of his second cause of action in the form
of sworn testimony from his affidavit and PCR petition, as set forth in more detail below.
First, Mr. Rinke alleged that his trial counsel failed to seek a comprehensive
mental health evaluation of Rinke, despite his awareness of Rinke’s severe, ongoing
mental health problems. Mr. Rinke alleged that his counsel allowed him to proceed with
an entry of a guilty plea under the same circumstances, despite having information that
the plea may not have been knowing, intelligent and voluntary, and despite admitting to
having knowledge of Mr. Rinke’s declining mental state.
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Rinke provided proof of this claim in his sworn petition and in his (first) sworn
affidavit in support. (See R. 284-85, 305-07). As stated above, Mr. Rinke’s counsel
conceded that they were aware of his ongoing mental health issues, in counsel’s own
statements to the Court. (See R. 382 (Tr. p. 75, l. 5 to p. 76, l. 12))(stating that “from the
very beginning”, counsel and the prosecuting attorney were aware of and concerned with
Mr. Rinke’s mental health status). In simplest terms, counsel was well aware of Mr.
Rinke’s debilitated mental health state, yet did nothing to protect his client’s interests or
ensure Mr. Rinke was proceeding in a knowing and informed manner.
Again, Mr. Rinke provided substantial additional evidence to support this
particular claim, in the form of the Neuropsychological Evaluation performed on Mr.
Rinke by Dr. Clay Ward. The report provided crucial evidence regarding Mr. Rinke’s
mental state and mental health status during the pendency of the case. For purposes of
attempted summary dismissal by the State, the report provided more than sufficient
evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact. (See R. 392-99)(consisting of Dr.
Ward’s Neuropsychological Evaluation of Isaac Rinke). As noted herein above, Dr.
Ward indicated that Mr. Rinke was very likely experiencing “an acute mental health
exacerbation and crisis” during the pendency of his case, with “no evidence in the record
that his mental state was stabilized prior to his legal proceedings”. Id at p. 8.
Additionally, Mr. Rinke provided additional evidence to support this claim in the
form of an affidavit from Jonathan Scaggs. (R. 362-63). Mr. Scaggs’ affidavit outlined
his personal observations of Mr. Rinke’s declining mental state just prior to Rinke’s
incarceration in his criminal case.
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As discussed herein above, the District Court gave little consideration to Mr.
Rinke’s evidence on this claim, especially the report from a respected neuropsychologist.
The evaluation report constituted significant evidence in support of Mr. Rinke’s PCR
claims, and raised a prima facie case of a genuine issue of material fact. However, it
appears the Court improperly held Mr. Rinke to a higher standard, requiring him to prove
the allegation altogether rather than simply making an initial prima facie showing. The
District Court erred by doing so. See Ash, supra; Schultz, 153 Idaho at 796.
Second, Mr. Rinke alleged that his counsel made representations to Rinke
regarding the proposed plea agreement, which either were not accurate or were not placed
on the record at the plea hearing, in order to protect Mr. Rinke’s due process rights at
sentencing. Mr. Rinke alleged that he detrimentally relied upon these statements in
deciding to plead guilty to two serious felony charges, and waiving his right to a jury
trial.
Mr. Rinke provided proof of this claim in his sworn petition and in his (first)
sworn affidavit in support. (See R. 286, 307-09).
Additionally, Mr. Rinke provided additional explanation of his problems and
concerns regarding the plea entry process, and his comments or lack thereof to the Court.
(See R. 320-21). Mr. Rinke explained why he did not alert the Court to the mental
distress he was experiencing and his concerns regarding entering pleas of guilty despite
his confusion. (Id). Curiously, the District Court completely ignored this evidence, and
instead summarily declared that Mr. Rinke had failed to raise a genuine issue of material
fact without explaining why Mr. Rinke’s evidence fell short of meeting that standard.
(See, generally, R. 494-97).
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The United States Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel extends to the plea bargaining process. Missouri v. Frye,
566 U.S. 134, 140, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1405 (2012); Fortin v. State, 160 Idaho 437, 445 (Ct.
App. 2016). Counsel had a duty to provide effective assistance of counsel to Mr. Rinke
during the plea process.

Mr. Rinke has provided evidence on each of his claims

concerning the plea process.
In summary, Rinke provided evidence and proof to support each of his claims in
his second cause of action. The parties disagree over those facts, creating a material issue
of fact for the Court’s resolution. See Wheeler, supra; (2017 Opinion No. 72, p. 3);
Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153; Thomas, supra, (2017 Opinion No. 6, p. 3). Summary
dismissal simply was not appropriate, under prevailing Idaho case law. The District
Court erred by granting summary dismissal of Mr. Rinke’s PCR claim.

3.

Evidence in Support of Third Cause of Action

Mr. Rinke’s third cause of action focused on errors and omissions of his trial
court counsel during the “sentencing phase” of the case. (See R. 286-90). Mr. Rinke
alleged that
“Counsel heedlessly disregarded Mr. Rinke’s legitimate interests
and committed legal error by failing to inform the Court that a mental
health evaluation was necessary for sentencing purposes, which later led
to Mr. Rinke being sentenced more harshly by the District Court.” (Id. at
286).
Mr. Rinke further alleged that his attorney failed to advise Mr. Rinke of his
ongoing right to remain silent during the pre-sentence investigation and domestic
violence evaluation process, pursuant to Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho at 561. (Id. at 288).
During those processes, Mr. Rinke did not exercise his right to remain silent, and instead
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made several damaging statements which the District Court relied upon in declaring that
Mr. Rinke was minimizing his actions.

Mr. Rinke asserted that based on those

statements, the District Court imposed a harsher sentence.
Finally, as to the third cause of action, Mr. Rinke alleged that his counsel failed to
take action to correct factually inaccurate statements offered by the Court at his
sentencing hearing. The District Court misstated and over exaggerated the extent of the
complaining witness’ injuries during the sentencing hearing. Mr. Rinke’s attorney failed
to object to those statements and failed to take any action to remedy the problem. The
record reflects that the District Court relied upon that inaccurate information to impose a
harsher sentence upon Mr. Rinke. (See, generally, R. 386-87 (Tr., p. 92, l. 20 to p. 93, l.
16).
The District Court rejected these claims, summarily claiming that Mr. Rinke
failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the mental health issue (Tr. 496-97),
that the Court cured any potential omission or error by counsel on the Estrada-related
claim (Tr. 505) (See Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558 (2006)), and that Mr. Rinke should
have raised the other issues on appeal (Tr. 503).
Again, Mr. Rinke asserts that the District Court held him to a higher standard that
simply establishing a prima facie case at the summary judgment stage of the PCR
proceedings. See Ash, supra; Blackburn, supra; Garza, supra.
Rinke provided evidence to support his petition’s third cause of action, in the
form of sworn testimony from his affidavit and petition, as set forth in more detail below.
First, Mr. Rinke alleged that his counsel heedlessly disregarded Rinke’s legitimate
interests and committed legal error by failing to inform the Court that a mental health
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evaluation was necessary for sentencing purposes. Mr. Rinke further asserted that this
failure led to a much harsher sentence from the District Court. Mr. Rinke provided proof
of this claim in his sworn petition and in his (first) sworn affidavit in support. (See R.
286-88, 305-07). Again as noted above, counsel conceded that they were aware of Mr.
Rinke’s ongoing mental health issues, in counsel’s direct statements to the District Court
at Mr. Rinke’s sentencing hearing. (See R. 382 (Tr. p. 75, l. 5 to p. 76, l. 12)). Mr. Rinke
provided further support that a mental health evaluation was necessary, and should have
been requested by his counsel, through Dr. Ward’s report, as discussed herein above.
(See R. 392-99)(consisting of Dr. Ward’s Neuropsychological Evaluation of Isaac
Rinke).
Idaho Code §19-2522 provides that a mental health evaluation is mandatory if
there is reason to believe that the mental condition of the defendant will be a significant
factor at sentencing and for good cause shown. State v. Coonts, 137 Idaho 150, 152 (Ct.
App. 2002); State v. McFarland, 125 Idaho 876, 879 (Ct. App. 1994). Despite having
full knowledge that their client’s mental condition was a substantial factor at sentencing,
Mr. Rinke’s counsel took no steps to ensure that a comprehensive mental health
evaluation was performed. In doing so, counsel disregarded established Idaho sentencing
law and procedure.
Second, Mr. Rinke alleged that his counsel failed to advise Mr. Rinke of his
ongoing right to remain silent during the PreSentence Report and the Domestic Violence
Evaluation processes.

Mr. Rinke further alleged that he subsequently made several

incriminating statements which the District Court relied upon in imposing a much harsher
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sentence. Mr. Rinke provided proof of this claim in his sworn petition and in his (first)
sworn affidavit in support. (See R. 288, 309-10).
Mr. Rinke alleged that his counsel failed to object to improper statements made
by the District Judge at the Sentencing Hearing, which the Court relied upon in imposing
a harsher sentence on Rinke. Specifically, Mr. Rinke alleged that the District Court
misstated and over exaggerated the extent of the complaining witness’ injuries in its
ruling, and his counsel failed to object or correct the record. Mr. Rinke provided proof of
this claim in his sworn petition and in his (first) sworn affidavit in support, and by
submission of the sentencing hearing transcript. (See R. 289, 311, 386-87 (Tr., p. 92, l.
20 to p. 93, l. 16).
The District Court erred when it ignored Mr. Rinke’s claim of error on the issue
of his counsel’s failure to object to the District Judge’s ignorance of the facts of the case
and improper reliance of false information in sentencing. The District Court instead
attempted to toss this aside as an overlooked appeal issue. In doing so, the District Court
missed the point. Mr. Rinke was arguing that his counsel performed deficiently by
failing to object to, or correct the record regarding, the Judge’s gross misstatement of the
facts. The District Court simply glossed over the issue, focusing on “judicial
misconduct” (see R. 503) rather than addressing Mr. Rinke’s argument of ineffective
assistance of counsel. The District Court failed to recognize that Mr. Rinke had provided
evidence to support his claim entitling him to an evidentiary hearing on the issue, and
therefore summary dismissal was inappropriate. See Payne, 159 Idaho at 883;
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho at 792. Because Mr. Rinke had created a genuine issue
of material fact with supporting evidence, an evidentiary hearing should have been
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conducted to resolve the factual issues. Takhsilov, supra, (2016 Opinion No. 6, p. 4);
Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho at 272. The District Court erred by granting summary
dismissal on this issue.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Rinke raised genuine issues of material fact in his PCR petition. Under
clearly-established Idaho law, summary judgment was not appropriate and Mr. Rinke was
entitled to an evidentiary hearing. The District Court committed reversible error by
summarily dismissing Mr. Rinke’s PCR case and entering judgment against him.
Mr. Rinke respectfully requests that this Court correct that error, by reversing the
District Court and remanding the case for further proceedings.

DATED this 29th day of September, 2017.
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